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The perspective of the low man on the totem pole has become the
major focus for Anglo-American legal study and conceptualization. Law,
in this conception, is a body of rules, the particularized expressions of
the command of the legal superior. While the person issuing the com-
mand is certainly making a choice in identifying and selecting a particular
practicable option, the content of that choice, the command, is beyond
the appraisal of the subordinate who receives it. From the perspective of
the political inferior, law does not allow for choice; it is merely the result
of the commands of the political superior, a body of rules to which the
inferior is subordinated. The function of the subordinate is to comply
personally or, where appropriate, to implement the command. The func-
tion of jurisprudence is to instruct on when and how to comply.
Austin's formula is frequently referred to as "the command theory" of
law, but it is actually the "commanded's theory of law" or the
"subordinate's theory of law." That perspective has determined what the
"important" jurisprudential problems are. Subordinates, who expect to be
the target of evils for deviations from commands of superiors, know that
they had better get the command right. Hence this perspective is almost
obsessively concerned with how one identifies law or, in a phrase recur-
ring in international legal inquiry, what comprise the "sources" of law
and, when they are inconsistent or contradictory, which of them is to
receive priority. Terms like "obliged" and "obligation" are, even now,
endlessly analyzed and detailed syntaxes of obedience are developed.
Because political superiors do not always make themselves clear, their
subordinates develop elaborate hermeneutic and interpretive codes to
ensure that the person receiving the command does exactly what the
political superior-omnipotent in everything but clarity of expression-
wanted. Because the commands of the political superior sometimes run
athwart personal or sub-group moral codes, detailed and often anguished
justifications for contingencies of non-compliance- "civil disobedi-
ence"-must be generated.3
This jurisprudence is not descriptive of how people actually perform
legal roles or how they actually comply. If that were the case, the
commanded's theory of law would be an even more complicated enter-
prise, for self-defined political inferiors engage in a great deal of choice
in the course of compliance. Rather, the commanded's jurisprudence is
prescriptive or "censorial," examining how the political inferior should
3. [d. at 169-72. For discussion, see W. Michael Reisman, The Tormented Conscience:
Applying and Appraising Unauthorized Coercion, 32 EMORY L.J. 499 (1983).
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